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Speaking of Torts
By WALTER PRoBERT*
There is a battle for power going on. This is one battle among
many to be heard in the land. Nor does it seem like a battle,
more like a debate over Truth. At stake is the way men will
speak-most particularly how men of the law will speak about
a part of the law, that part called "Torts," so called in the law
schools, at least. This is but a comment upon the war of the
writers of Torts.
The assumption of the writers of recent years, apparently,
was that generally speaking liability in tort turned upon fault.
Even according to this view, there were situations where liability
occurred even though a defendant was not at fault, but this was
the exception, not the general rule. The fault doctrine may no
longer be so glibly stated. True, there are still those, perhaps a
majority, who look upon fault, or something very like fault, as
the basic principle of tort law. But there are at least two other
views: one, that fault doctrine as a basic principle has been
swallowed up by the numerous exceptions; the other, that fault
never has been the basis of liability and certainly is not now the
basis of liability
While most of those who write about torts are law school
teachers, this is much more than a mere academic debate. The
outcome of this battle for power in the manipulation of tort principles will hit deeply into all corners of the legal arena. On the
surface, the debate may seem to some a bit of a game of words.
Actually, at stake are considerably divergent attitudes and value
systems. It follows that the most "practical" of practitioners
should at least look in, so to speak, mainly because the verbal
patterns for the legal profession seem, to a very great extent, to
*

Visiting Professor of Law, Northwestern University.

1 Sufficient citation to history as well as to variations in the current formula-

tions will be found in the following two articles, hereafter discussed in more
detail: James, "Tort Law in Midstream: Its Challenge to the Judicial Process,"
8 Buf. L. Rev. 815 (1959); R. Keeton, "Conditional Fault in the Law of Torts,"
72 Harv. L. Rev. 401 (1959).

SPEAxmG OF TORTS

be stabilized in the law schools. Remember, today it is in the law
school that the indoctrination comes, leaving permanent verbal
patterns deeply imprinted upon most of those who "make it."
Unfortunately, much of this debate goes on without conscious
consideration of current theories of language behavior. Studies of
the language of torts, as opposed to the study of torts, are
practically nil.2 This debate or any other cannot today be
properly considered without at least some analysis of the language
behavior involved.
Something of the History
What you believe about the happenings of days gone by
depends largely upon what you read, and so it will be with the
history of torts. On the matter of discovering the underlying
principles of the law of torts, it really does little good to read
at all, at least about the early English history, for there are widely
diverging reports. Take your choice: liability was strict. Liability
was not strict. However all seem to agree that the mere causing
of damage set up a sort of presumption of liability. But "cause'
itself turns out to be an evaluative word, not too different from
"fault", leaving the history3 pursuit somewhat unsatisfying for

most of those who pursue it.

Yet there should be no surprise over the disagreement. There
is more of history in our bones and nervous systems, osmotically
transmitted in a time-binding tradition, than there is in the books
we can read. All we can report of history, particularly of the
law of torts history, is what we can read. All we can read are
case reports and scant texts. Imagine for a moment judging
today's societies by their case reports and hornbooks. Furthermore, we must read through eyes cast in a current mold. No, we
will learn little from that pursuit, at least in this instance.
We can learn from history, at least more recent history, that
there is present a desire and perhaps a need to find an overriding
principle of the law of torts, something to explain, in an abbreviated way, what has been happening in this area. "Science" is
supposed to involve a similar urge. Its principle of parsimony
2 Some attention has been given to the language of
F. Cohen, "Field Theory and Judicial Logic," 59 Yale
Green, "The Study and Teaching of Tort Law," 84 Texas
alia; Malone, "Ruminations on Cause-in Fact," 9 Stan. L.
3 See note 1, supra.

torts by such people as
L.J. 238, 251 (1950);
L. Rev. 1 (1957), inter
Rev. 60 (1956).
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calls for as few principles as possible to explain the workings of
Nature. Many tort scholars seem to be working under that
principle. Perhaps the principle of parsimony is not unique to
science. It seems to be a pedagogical device also. The scholarteachers of tort law, for instance, look for something to explain
the cases. Many somehow or other find, through this pursuit, a
certain small number of principles.
The famous Wigmore once suggested that if there were
unifying principles it was not to be found in the name "Torts."
He was all for complete abolition of that label.4 But that name
is at least one common element to all those situations called tort,
by definition. There were and are other similarities in tort situations. There are procedural similarities, serving to distinguish
tort litigation from criminal but not contract. Certainly there
can be found underlying principles for each of the nominate
torts. Thus, battery involves some kind of bodily touching and
so on. And some believe there are even fewer principles tieing
all the nominate torts together, for instance, the famous triad of
intentional wrongdoing, negligence and strict liability. These
principles prove more a matter of hindsight description than
devices of prediction or explanation. Wigmore suggested that
the guideposts were to be found under the headings of "damage,"
"responsibility," and "justification."5
Most of the writers do agree that the significant growth of
negligence doctrines was in the early 1800's, against the backdrop
of what came to be called the Industrial Revolution, and fault
became the predominant theme of tort liability.' Certainly the
literature is full of this kind of talk, reference to laissez-faire economic theories, leave-business-alone government, self-reliance and
responsibility, individualism and so on and on. Certainly there is
evident a tendency in the scholarly literature as well as in judicial
reports to bring to bear this kind of language to explain tort
liability of all kinds.
But "most" is not "all." Roscoe Pound, some time ago, while
giving a sort of lip service to the fault notion, subtly suggested
4 Wigmore, Selected Cases on the Law of Torts vii (1911).
5 Wigmore, "The Tripartite Division of Torts," 8 Harv. L. Rev. 200 (1894).
6 For some comments on the fault basis of tort law, see Holmes, The Common
Law 144-163 (1881); Radin, "A Speculative Inquiry into the Nature of Torts,"
21 Tex. L. Rev. 697 (1943); Seavey, Cogitations on Torts (1954).
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that that way of talking was all right for its time. He added that

all this was really based on an underlying philosophy focussed
upon free will. There were better ways of putting it. (He too
was involved in looking for the fewest possible explanatory
principles.) He suggested that a better framework would come
from talking about the expectations of individuals about themselves and their societies.7 Out of this came his famed theory of
interests which according to at least one author has heavily
impregnated today's doctrine of negligence.8 As noteworthy as
his move away from fault notions, probably more noteworthy,
was his radical reorganization of not just tort theories, but all law
theories. Under a theory of interests, one does not look for
common principles of torts, rather he looks for common principles
for all of law, so that torts and contracts lose their identity as
such.' This way of talking has not captured the legal profession.
Yet there are even more all-embracing ways of talking which
have been proposed.' 0
This sort of talk could be expected from Pound, for he is a
jurisprudent, not a tort specialist. Yet Leon Green seems to have
had similar thoughts, about thirty years ago. He proved to be
another prophet, for that era, for his way of talking and organizing, just in the area of torts, has not yet captured the tongues
of the legal profession either. To oversimplify, his approach
has been to look at at tort situations for their common grounds of
"facts" and later procedural happenings, such as judge and jury
relationships. Yet, the influence of his way of talking will probably prove considerable."
Whatever tort law has been, the taught law of torts has been
predominantly focussed around notions of fault, as witness the
7 Pound, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law 145-190 (1922).
8 Seavey, Cogitations on Torts 27 (1954); Prosser, Law of Torts 12 (2d

ed. 1955).
0 A prospective litigant's interests may be frustrated in various ways by
persons promoting their own interests. The interests may be catalogued, as
Pound has in many places indicated, and considered straight on without the
camouflage of contract or tort or other legal doctrine.
10The scholars responsible for the more all-embracing system are Harold
Lasswell and Myres McDougal of Yale Law School. Representative of their
insights and methodology are: Lasswell and McDougal, "Legal Education and
Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest," 52 Yale L.J. 203
(1943); McDougal, "Law as a Process of Decision: A Policy-Oriented Approach
to Legal Study," 1 Nat. L. Forum 53 (1956).
11 Green, Malone, Pedrick, Rabl, Cases on Torts (1957); Green, "The Study
and Teaching of Tort Law," 34 Tex. L. Rev. 1 (1957).
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casebooks which have been in use and as witness the hornbooks in
use in law schools around the country. There are signs, however,
of a change in this way of talking. The principal factor, or disrupting influence if you wish, has been the increasing use, in
court and mostly out, of liability insurance. Those who would
talk in terms of "fault" or in synonymous terms, find insurance
hardly relevant. To those who are not enchanted with such
doctrines, little else seems relevant.
The War Games
One of the early crusaders for tort-insurance statements rather
than tort-fault statements has been Fleming James. 2 He does
say that fault-talking has been predominant in tort statements, but
still not universal. Furthermore, he well indicates that "fault" has
been used in several senses, referring alternately to laissez faire
notions, to the reasonable man standard, and to a legal standard.
Of course, as James and others have recognized, the latter
reference of "fault" can be found any time a person is held
liable for causing damage, that is, such a person is at fault
because he is liable. In such a manner the term loses all significance for analytical purposes.
More important, in James' recent statements he argues that
there are no overriding principles which will unite and integrate
all lower order tort doctrines. 1 3 For example, any effort to reduce
the analysis of all tort principles to the familiar formula: duty,
breach of duty, proximate cause, and damage, is not helpful
according to James, for the presence or lack of duty to act in a
certain way to avoid damage is only one way of stating the problem the court faces in a tort case. Such terminology does not
solve the court's (or the attorney's) problem.
More fruitful than a search for summarizing principles,
according to James, would be fact studies. Since litigation is an
attempt to resolve conflicts arising out of behavior in society, that
behavior should be studied. Legal solutions should be reached
by analysis of extensive field studies, and decision makers should
2
1

James, "Tort Law in Midstream: Its Challenge to the Judicial Process,"
8 Buf. L. Rev. 315 (1959); see also Harper and James, The Law of Torts (3vl.
1956) in which is incorporated much of James earlier writings.
3. All subsequent comments about James concern chiefly his article cited in
note 12.
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consider the impact of their decisions upon the parties and society
generally. Others have talked this way about law generally and
in a more scientifically oriented way, but it is a way of talking
which could bring significant changes in the behavioral responses
of teachers, lawyers, and judges. This is a way of talking which
has not yet made significant gains in the legal world.
While James renounces the possibility of finding overriding
tort principles he does in effect pronounce an overriding method
of approaching the problems of torts. This viewpoint seems
chronologically to have come out of a belief that much of the
law of torts can currently be explained as a response to the
increasing importance of liability insurance as a vehicle for
distributing the loss arising out of a damage situation over large
groups of people rather than inflicting it upon a particular
plaintiff or defendant. These conclusions stem in part from fact
studies which have already been made in the automobile accident
area. James has been crusading so that this tort-insurance idea
might be applied to much of the tort area. So a particular
defendant would be found liable perhaps because he has insurance or as some would have it, because he belongs to a class of
persons who should bear the particular risk involved and can best
do so by carrying insurance."4 Since the insurance company,
ultimately the persons insured by that company, actually pays,
it does not make sense to talk about fault for clearly the company
is not at fault. Courts do not presently talk about insurance, but
both courts and juries respond to the fact of its existence.
Ultimately under the James, the Green,' and other theories,
insurance will be consciously considered ,and new schemes of
handling the automobile problem will probably arise.
Naturally, there are going to be people who disagree with
such a way of talking and behaving. A fairly recent disagreement
comes from Robert Keeton."0 He declares that fault is still a
predominant basis for liability, or if not that, "conditional fault."
He suggests that despite contrary views fault has been the basis
of liability for many centuries in the English-speaking countries.
4The outstanding example has been the use of explosives in blasting. James
and others would apply this principle to automobile "accidents."
15 Green, Traffic Victims (1958).
10 Subsequent reference to Keeton concerns his statements in "Conditional
Fault in the Law of Torts," 72 Harv. L. Rev. 401 (1959).
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While defendants were assessed for causing damages without
reference to what we now call the reasonableness of their conduct,
that was the approach because it was probably considered blameworthy to cause damage.
Keeton attempts to demonstrate that in those situations where
courts impose liability under the headings of strict liability rather
than those of negligence or intent, in the blasting cases, for
instance, the man in the street would want to impose liability
because there is either fault or conditional fault. Keeton means
by "conditional fault" that a person or legal entity is at fault if
he engages in permissible conduct, say blasting, involving unavoidable risks, if he does not arrange to pay for the loss he
causes. Liability does not come simply because there is insurance,
but because the man ought to arrange somehow to pay for the
damage he causes in such circumstances. Fault can be removed
by taking out insurance.
Keeton admits of a few exceptions, but finds tort law breaking
down into three categories, acceptable conduct where there is
no liability for causing damage, unacceptable or faulty conduct
where there will be liability for causing damage, and conditionally acceptable conduct, as described above.17 For Keeton,
then, fault (as qualified) is still a predominant factor in the law
of torts. Insurance is also a factor but not a predominant one,
else why have not courts talked about insurance more often?
Besides, if insurance is the solution to the various problems of
tort law, or even many of them, the obvious move would be for
everyone to take out insurance to cover himself. Yet, reasons
Keeton, such an approach will never be taken because of the
harm it would bring: irresponsible conduct, unjust results, and
so on. He concludes that it is not sensible to speak of insuranceloss-distribution as replacing fault in the law of torts.
Critique
It would be easy to say about either the James or the Keeton
approach that it is wrong. Beware, however, of falling into a
linguistic trap. Even law people have great difficulty in seeing
the considerable flexibility there is in language usage and the
17 This summary of Keeton's categories is paraphrased from a paraphrase
found in Gregory and Kalven, Cases and Materials on Torts 542 (1959).
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powerful tools that words become in the manipulation of the
unwary.
Take Keeton's conditional fault notion. So similar are these
words to "fault" in appearance and grammatical function that
many of his readers are likely not to recognize the few distinctions he does draw between the expressions. Further, both of
these expressions, as he admits and then seems to forget, are
oversimplifications. Consider the vast complex of events that
leads up to a single piece of litigation: the persons, the activities,
the discussions, the planning and studying, the individual backgrounds, the psychologies, the confusions, the words, the feelings,
and so on. These are distilled into a trial report, further distilled
into appellate opinion, further distilled by the commentator on
judicial opinions-each commentator distilling according to his
own equipment, his own perspective. Then it is further distilled
into a word or two.' From an operational, functional, pragmatic,
semantic, experiential, or however you wish to describe it, point
of view, such an expression is practically "meaningless."
However, and note this well, this is not to say that a person
may not talk that way. The plain fact is that people do talk that
way. Nor is it to say that they may not properly talk that way,
for it definitely is a way of talking, and so far as I know there
is no law, God's or otherwise, which prohibits that way of talking.
What of James? Despite the doctrinal skill which he has
displayed in his writings, he is not altogether doctrinaire in
approach. Indeed he seems something like a theologian friend
of mine who gives his congregation only so much of his avant
garde Christian talk as they can stand. James, glory be, gives
signs of being heretical in his law approach.
But his is not necessarily the final answer, nor the only way
of talking about torts. His approach can be labelled as sociological, or empirical, or pragmatic, or even scientific. Yet he too
is oversimplifying the situation-as do we all when we apply our
own unique personalities to what small portion of the world's
total happenings we can absorb.
He suggests that there is a strong urge toward strict liability
18 Somewhat in point is the plight of the law student who condensed his
class notes into successively smaller outlines. Finally one key word sufficed to
remind him of an entire course. Then on the fateful examination morning-he
forgot the word.
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where there is insurance. Yet what have been his criteria of proof
of that statement. 19 This seems no less glib an assumption than
Keeton's statement about how the man in the street will react to
certain paper situations which Keeton has created. There is no
indication that either of them has taken a Gallup-type poll.
Again, James protests that our present system of handling
automobile litigation is a "miserable failure." By what criteria?
His own reactions, of course. But we may not agree. Seldom
does the critic draw out all his reasons. Indeed, he cannot do so.
To some extent he must end up giving us what are his mere
reactions, but often they are given as if there were some greater
truth to them.
Back to Keeton. From another point of view his word choices
are meaningful, most functional, even if lacking in as complete
communication as possible. His article turns out to be a large
scale attempt at persuasive definition. 20 "Fault," and so conditional fault, is a word which has seemingly won by tradition a
considerable following in law persons. As such, it can be counted
on to bring conditioned responses in a large body of law persons
who are not fully aware of the techniques of verbal hypnotism.
There is advantage in keeping such old friends on hand. Mr.
Keeton's use of "fault" and "conditional fault" amounts to something on this order: "I (Keeton) do not like what I see. There
are those who would apportion liabilities and losses among
people according to current insurance distribution patterns. For
reasons best known to me, if anybody, I do not care for that
result." In the sense that a word or phrase is redefined every time
it is used, fault is redefined by Keeton to include almost all of
the judicial history of torts to date.
James uses the same technique to bring disfavor to the word
"fault" and certain other tort words which have gained acceptance
via habit. His objective is in part to renounce such words, bring
a negative reaction to them among law-word users. In this case,
the technique is every bit as proper as Keeton's. James also
19 Furthermore, what are the factors which distinguish "strict liability" from

liability based upon "fault?" About all I can do on some occasions to accent the
distinction which is supposed to exist is pound my fist on the desk-and repeat
the appropriate words of art.
20 For elaboration of the technique of persuasive definition, see Probert,
"Law and Persuasion: The Language Behavior of Lawyers," 108 Univ. of Penn.

L. Rev. 35 (1959).
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wishes, I would think, to bring his economic and metaphysical
views to the forefront in the law of torts. He too is engaging in
the battle for leadership in this area.
Now if all this sounds rather nasty and undignified, please
bear along. My effort is not to insult nor pick, but to suggest
how ways of using language and reacting to language may tend
to obscure the individuals doing the wording-as well as their
goals.
To go on with it. James' suggestion of a "more fruitful"
approach begs for a following, so to speak. If we do follow, we
will do so only because of faith in a particular person or some
point of view which we share, or some mistaken notion that James
has given us some portion of the latest "truths."
James would probably claim no such ultimacy for his views
(I am not so sure of Keeton). Yet his words do not readily reveal
the qualification which theories of language behavior would
impose. 21 Yet, he too is free to talk the way he does. Disagreement with his choice of law words or the words he would have
as law words will probably be disagreement with his objectives
as best we can know them. At the moment I see no way acceptable to me of proving or disproving either his or Keeton's contentions.
Likewise there are other ways of talking. Some have already
been suggested. Even different ways can and probably will be
developed. Messrs. Lasswell and McDougal would talk in an
even wider sweep than James.22 They would share his belief in
the "necessity" of going outside of the opinions and the law
courts to discover the various factors which one may consider in
deciding a case or planning a system of compensation for hurts,
or deciding how to talk about the cases or the system. Their
language would be in terms of what they call "values," a way of
talking which includes within its scope ultimately all things and
events and interrelationships. Most people will not presently
accept this way of talking because of its strangeness to them.
There is a strength of verbal habit here which forces us to look
21 As yet, the best organized treatment of the interrelation of language and
other behavior is to be found in Korzybski, Science and Sanity (4th ed. 1958), the
theory of general semantics. For an application of this theory to legal language,
see "The Language of Law, A Symposium," 9 West. Res. L. Rev. 115 (1958).
22 See note 10, supra.
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at events through one set of classifications. One of the widest
spread inhibitions is that of inflexibility in verbal manipulation
of world events. Lasswell and McDougal share with Charles
Morris2 3 of "semantics" fame a desire to cross-fertilize the ways

of talking that now exist in the various human endeavors, on the
philosophical assumption that all endeavor is or may be treated
as interrelated. One may look at things that way. Whether they
will gather a following depends upon whether the verbal habits
can be changed.
Of lesser scope but perfectly legitimate would be a way of
talking about torts which would find its emphasis around the
damages which juries and judges have actually assessed. This
element has been much neglected in the total picture. Then too,
those who spend their time investigating the facts behind individual cases, the private investigators, would, given the needed
intellectual equipment, develop another way of talking. The way
of talking turns out to be a function of purpose. Those who have
a definite purpose tend to fight for their way of putting it. The
pawns are those who care little what way the game goes. Yet
they have their influence in that game as do the mass of uninformed voters upon the outcome of an election.
What Difference Does It Make
Since words do seem to affect persons via some minute change
in the nervous system at the least, bringing life or death behavior
at the most, I would guess that the reader will agree that the way
one chooses to talk about tort-situations has some significance.
One may respond to words as if they were things, but as the
words vary, so will his response. Again, one may respond the
way that current theories of language behavior suggest, as if
words were largely symbols, representatives of things. To the
degree that the symbols used in tort law point to larger and larger
combinations of things and events, to that degree the variables
which affect the decision-maker, the analyst, and the predicter,
are increased. Again, we cannot be sure, but it may make a
difference, and probably will. James' scheme would throw the
burden of automobile accidents on an insurance system rather
than individual tortfeasors, for instance.
23

Morris, Signs, Language and Behavior (1946).
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The way one talks about any problem-situation helps to
decide his response to the problem. By way of simple example,
consider the person who plans what he has already decided is a
necessary trip to a somewhat distant city in the United States. He
may literally ask himself which means of transportation he should
use. He may be able to say that he can save some money if he
finds enough people to share a ride by automobile. (Although
others might argue that he is not actually saving money, what
he says rules the day until he can be convinced to speak differently
to himself.) He may say that the airplane is faster, but more
expensive. Perhaps he will think in words of an anxiety producing nature when he thinks of airplanes. Our traveler can make
his decision at this point on the basis of his limited information
words-or he can gather more information and make further
evaluations. He can inquire which mode is more comfortable,
which more interesting, and so on. He can inquire into bus or
train travel. The more the variables, the more likely the decision
maker will make a decision varying in significant ways from his
relatively uninformed decision. And so it is, I would think, with
decision makers who consider the problems of torts.24 But the
thing some critics forget is that decisions can be often made on
the basis of little or no information at all, that is, little or no new
information relevant to a particular problem-situation.
What way of talking about torts is the best? The answer to
such a question of course depends upon the "ethical" language
one uses and so the variables he considers. Incidentally, it is
difficult to get the language of ethics into court, so that whatever
variables that language carries with it may often be ignored.
However, legal scholars have been trying other ways to smuggle
the information in. Thus, James' approach proves a significant
way to do just that job, and whether you call his kind of language
the language of ethics or of sociology or of law does not from this
point of view make too much difference. At any rate there are
many today who will refuse to answer a "what is best" question,
on the grounds that bestness is a matter of personal preference.
Still and again, many is not all or most. If a person will respond
24 See the excellent discussion of the ways the rules of evidence help keep
"relevant" information from the jury in Loevinger, "Facts, Evidence and Legal
Proof," 9 West. Res. L. Rev. 154 (1958). The text discussion can be said to
involve the problem of blocking and unblocking the channels of communication.
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one way to language he somehow regards as best, yet another
way to the other forms, then it makes a difference how this question is answered if it is answered at all.
It is the lawyer's business, of course, to know the preferences
of the people he wishes to influence. Theories of language behavior tend to reveal these preferences. The very language used
in most areas of discourse, including the language of this article
more often than I wish, give impressions of bestness or worseness
about things and events which are described. Mr. James and Mr.
Keeton and anyone who has written about torts do give the
impression that what they say is presently the best way of saying
it. As often as not the criteria for judgment are ignored and the
writer, consciously or unconsciously, relies upon the technique of
persuasive definition to block off full communication and gain
agreement.
Who Will Win
Styles change. Look at the Arts. Many of us accept with
gratitude the varying ways of the novelists, the poets, and the
playwrights (although many complain of the changes as not
being "Art.") Some speak of the obsolete forms as cliche-ridden,
trite. And we are all affected by these changing forms. The
aesthetic and intellectual "senses" can be tickled and pleased
by the changes in the art of painting. We may call these changes
progress or evolution-or regression-but change it is. Such
changes in expression and in gross behavior take place in a vastly
complex way.
Legal language may be looked at as an art form, a medium of
expression, a manifestation of the culture-complex. (I did not
say that legal language is art). Changes take place here too.
Dramatic in the abstract, for instance, have been the changes
from forms of action thinking to cause of action thinking to today's emphasis on the talk-it-out discovery procedures. True,
there is more involved than language, but then in the end we are
concerned here with language behavior as it is interrelated with
other behavior. The change in language gives clues as to potential
changes in other behavior.
As the arts have their would-be-leaders, their battlers for
prestige, influence, and appreciation, as well as improvement, so
we of the law have our leaders and would-be-leaders, Messrs.
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James and Keeton, for instance. Viewed in this light, rather than
the light of justice and truth, such expressions take on a different
glow.
There are signs in the land of the direction of motion of legal
expressionism in the area of torts. Change is certain here, not just
created change, but change in an evolutionary sense. Perhaps we
grow tired of the old cliches, perhaps we desire a different form
of expression, a new way of looking at tort-things, but the change
is occurring.
When I took torts in law school (about twelve years ago) I
heard nothing that I recall, of the impact of liability insurance
upon tort theories; and as a matter of trial tactics, insurance
talking was taboo. No criticism intended; I doubt that many others
talked about liability insurance as changing the tort doctrines
either. Oh, the prophets had been abroad for some time, but so
it is with this kind of change. Actually there were other unsuccessful prophets whose predictions went unreceived, but we
remember only the successful ones. We are being led now into
a different way of talking and so a different way of behavior.
Some move is inevitable; that we move, or have already moved,
in this direction is perhaps "chance" in the large scale of things.
Note that even Keeton, with his "conservative" language (in
the most literal sense of that word, retaining the old forms)
signals the change. He dared not say that "fault" was the key
expression. It is now "conditional fault." This sort of face-saving
device has been used for centuries in the common law process.
Perhaps some such catalytic agent as conditional fault will serve
as much as the bold talk of James to work the change that James
desires.
But there are other signs and other leaders. Consider the
casebooks of the law schools. Surely what is being taught signals
the changes in the total process of tort talk. One of these casebooks which has received modem endorsement was fathered by
Leon Green as much as three decades ago.25 He then primed the
charge for the explosion now taking place. His then daring and
even now intellectually progressive linguistic approach to torts
should be examined by every law person who would understand
25

Creen, Malone, Pedrick, Rahl, Cases on Torts (1957); see a review of this
book at 52 N. W. Univ. L. Rev. 295 (1957).
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the process of the change. Suffice it here to say by way of
oversimplification that he showed the way to a different organization of tort cases and thus heralded the possibility of a number of
different ways of organizing those cases and so talking about them.
Another casebook takes what a short time ago would have
been daring liberties with the taboos of the courtroom. 2 That
insurance is an integral part of the considerations regarding tort
liability becomes here an accepted fact, going even beyond Mr.
James and his colleague, Mr. Harper, in their significant signs
of the time treatise.
Not to be forgotten here is Mr. Belli, King of Torts, as he
has been called. In the law-persons' class struggle for leadership
he is disdained by the "scholars." By most any definition he is
no scholar, but an advocate for the plaintiff approach who uses
some of the scholarly forms for influence. This makes him no
worse than the scholars, this makes him no less a leader or
potential leader (and he clearly desires that position) one whom
scholars will eventually have to watch despite themselves. Of
course his main concern is not with all of torts as that is taught
in the classroom, but only the so-called personal injury aspects.
The way these and others talk will be repeated eventually by
more and more of those who stop, look, and listen. I predict
that more and more lawyers and judges will listen and talk this
way also, or in turn lose their own power positions, for other
ways of handling tort problems are being suggested. The change
will surely come, unless, of course, other leaders I do not now see
move us in another direction.
My Preference
I suppose I have telegraphed this conclusion and necessarily
detracted from the strength of my recommendations. If so, I
have succeeded somewhat in my purpose of suggesting how
writing styles usually mask the personality and preferences of
the writer. I must confess, for whatever good it might do, a
sympathy with the forces of Leon Green, Fleming James, and
Company. I believe that the changes of the future will come
from the sort of study that Mr. James has suggested, the signs
26
Gregory and Kalven, Cases and Materials on Torts (1959).
27
Harper and James, The Law of Torts (3 vol. 1956).
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of the broader behavioral processes point' unwaveringly in that
direction. The experiments could go pretty much as he suggests.
These will be pilot studies, but ultimately they will not be enough.
There are others who want to see the scientific method at least
tried out here, and that method calls for more precision than Mr.
James has yet suggested. Indeed, it calls for a much more
thorough-going, systematic, linguistically and psychologically
clarified inquiry than he suggests.
One may dream faster than the events may move. Still,
dreams have a way of turning up in real life. Yesterday's
dreams, some of them, are today's signs of things soon to come,
in torts as it is with all we do.
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